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Abstract  Passwords are the first line of defense for many 
computerized systems. The quality of these passwords decides 
the security strength of these systems. Many studies advocate 
using password entropy as an indicator for password quality 
where lower entropy suggests a weaker or less secure password. 
However, a closer examination of this literature shows that 
password entropy is very loosely defined. In this paper, we first 
discuss the calculation of password entropy and explain why it 
is an inadequate indicator of password quality. We then 
establish a password quality assessment scheme: password 
quality indicator (PQI). The PQI of a password is a pair 
),( LD=λ  , where D is the Levenshtein's editing distance of 
the password in relation to a dictionary of words and common 
mnemonics, and L is the effective password length. Finally, we 
propose to use PQI to prescribe the characteristics of good 
quality passwords. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
uthentication Authentication and authorization are the 
foundation of information security. Authentication is 
responsible for verifying that a person is really who he/she 
claims, and authorization is about assigning appropriate 
privileges to the person after the verification of his/her 
identity. There are 3 types of authentications [10, p 209]: (i) 
something the user knows, for example, password and PIN 
(personal identity number), (ii) something the user has, for 
example, physical keys, access cards, and smart cards etc., 
and (iii) something the user is  so called biometric 
authentication, such as voice recognition [14], fingerprints 
matching, and iris scanning etc. Password authentication is 
simple, accurate, and effective and will continue to be the 
working horse of information security. According to [11], 
who reported the panel discussion at RSA 2005 conference, 
“Password will be with us forever”, because “We've got to 
make security simpler to use if it's going to be effective”, as 
suggested by the panel members. 
The strength of password authentication relies on the 
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strength of the passwords. Therefore, measuring the quality 
of password becomes an interesting topic. For example, how 
can we accurately measure the quality difference of 
passwords “akjuwfg” and “D$f9” and therefore provide a 
quantitative measurement on which one is better? Password 
entropy is mentioned as a quality indicator for passwords in 
many occasions. Higher entropy means better quality. Most 
of the literature just briefly mentions that one should choose 
the passwords with higher entropy, for example [15]. There 
are just a few which actually provide the details on the 
calculation or estimation of password entropy [2]. After 
carefully examining the literature, we realize that the concept 
of password entropy is actually loosely defined. The 
suggested estimations are far from indicating the quality of a 
password. The concept of information entropy was 
introduced by Shannon [12] to measure information content. 
It has been widely used in communication, coding, and 
cryptography etc. areas [8]. The calculation of the entropy is 
based on a statistic distribution model of a language and is 
conducted on a model of n order Markov process. This is 
actually the fundamental reason why entropy cannot be used 
as a quality indicator for passwords 
• As all agreed, there is no statistic distribution for 
passwords. We doubt if it is possible to establish 
this distribution, even with a collection of large 
number of sample passwords. Unlike English 
words, where we follow certain rules to 
communicate with each other, choosing a password 
is not for communication purpose. There is no 
uniform rule for everybody to follow. It may 
therefore not exist a converge model. 
• Password guessing is not a Markov process. There is 
no such thing as knowing the first several 
characters of a password and then proceeding to the 
following characters, where the knowledge of these 
leading characters can help to guess the next 
characters. Guessing a password is an all or
nothing game. Either you get the password exactly 
as it is, or nothing at all. Therefore, it is 
meaningless to calculate password entropy based 
on the composing characters. 
• Guessing entropy [9] is not an appropriate indicator 
for the quality of individual password either. It only 
establishes the low boundary for how many guesses 
needed to crack passwords. 
In this paper, we advocate a different means of measuring 
password quality  password quality indicator (PQI) [7]. We 
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believe that the quality of a password is decided by the time 
required to crack the password. The longer time it requires, 
the stronger the password is. The PQI of a password is a pair 
),( LD=λ , where D is the Levenshtein's editing distance 
(Levenshtein, 1965) of the password to the base dictionary 
words, and L is the effective password length. The effective 
password length is the equivalent length of the password in 
the standard password format, which consists of only the 10 
digit characters (0-9). From PQI, we further develop a 
concise rule for choosing a good password: a good password 
should be at least 8 characters long, with at least 3 special 
characters plus other alphanumeric characters. The rule is 
easy to remember and easy to be checked by a computer 
program. It avoids the costly operation of proactive 
password checking [5,1,15]. 
The paper is organized as follows. We first study 
password entropy and then develop the rationale of our 
password quality indicator theory. We conclude the paper 
with a summary. 
II. CALCULATING PASSWORD ENTROPY 
Let’s envisage a device which randomly generate lower 
case English letters (a to z), one character after another. We 
guess what letter is before it comes. If the device does not 
have any predefined patterns to follow, each of the 26 letters 
has the equal chance ( 26
1 ) to be generated. We just randomly 
guess a character out of the 26. As we cannot precisely 
predicate the letter to be generated, there is therefore 
uncertainty. The uncertainty is decided by how rare or 
common an event (a letter being generated) happens. In this 
case, it is the same ( 26
1 ) for every letter. However, if we 
know that the device only generates 3 letter long English 
words, the guess game will be different. At very beginning, 
without any existing knowledge about the word to be 
generated, we may try a more likely leading letter, say “t”. 
After we see the second letter, say “h”, we can almost certain 
that the third letter will be “e”, and the word is “the”. 
Let Nωωω ...21=Ω  be the stream of characters (letters) 
generated by the device, where 1ω , 2ω , …, or nω  takes the 
value from a character set },...,,{ 21 MC ααα= . In the case of 
the previously discussed letter generating device, C  has the 
26 lower case English letters. 1α  represents the letter a, 2α  
represents the letter b, and so on, and 26=M . The 
possibility of the ith character generated is )( iP ω , or simply 
iP . The uncertainty can be calculated by the following 
formula: 
))(log(1log i
i
i PP
u ω−==  
The overall uncertainty on Ω  is: 
))(log()(
1
0 i
N
i
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
=
−=Ω  
This formula just simply sums each individual uncertainty 
together. In the calculation, we assume that the characters 
generated are independent from each other. The knowledge 
of previously generated characters does not have any impact 
on our guess of the next character. After seeing large amount 
of the characters generated by the device, we can calculate 
the average uncertainty of the character set: 
))(log()(
1
0 ii
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or simply 
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This is the famous Shannon entropy formula. Uncertainty 
is just the other name of entropy. The subscript 0 of 0H  
indicates that the combinations of characters are independent 
from each other. 
In the guessing game, if we know that the device only 
generates 3 characters long English words, we then can have 
the knowledge of already being generated characters to help 
us more accurately guess the next character, because the yet
to come character, to certain degree, depends on the 
previous 1, 2, 3, or more characters. This process is thus a 
Markov process. 
III. MARKOV PROCESSES 
Let },...,,{ 21 TXXXX =  be a sequence of T random 
variables, 0≥T , },...,,{ 21 MVVV=V  be the set of M states in 
a Markov process. V  is actually the character set C  
discussed before. There is a 1 to 1 mapping between iV  and 
iα , Mi ≤≤1 . Consider the conditional probabilities:  
),...,|( 1111 xXxXxXP tttt === −−  
where t = 1, 2, …, T are values taken by the corresponding 
variables tX , x1, x2, ,,, xt take values from V . If the event at 
time t depends only on the immediately preceding event at 
time t  1, i.e., 
 
)|(),...,|( 111111 −−−− ====== tttttttt xXxXPxXxXxXP
 
The process is called a first order Markov process. If we 
look at the guessing game discussed previously, when we see 
character “t”, we will guess the next character `based on the 
knowledge of “t”, and most likely, we will guess the 
character “h”, as there is more chance for “h” to follow “t” 
than any other characters. However, after we see the 
character “h”, we won’t have the knowledge of “t” any more, 
and we only base on “h” to guess the next character. We may 
not be able to guess “e”. To be able to guess the next 
character based on the knowledge of previous 2 characters, 
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we need second order Markov process: 
),|(
),...,|(
2211
1111
−−−−
−−
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tttttt
tttt
xXxXxXP
xXxXxXP  
IV. CALCULATING ENTROPY ON MARKOV PROCESSES 
If every character is independent from the others, we have 
zero order Markov process. The calculation of entropy is 
straightforward:. 
 
))(log()(
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as discussed before. For the first order Markov process, 
where a character depends on its immediate previous 
character, we have )(1 ΩH  and 1H : 
 
)))(log()()(
))((log()(
1
11
2
1
11

=
−−
=
−
×
+−=Ω
M
j
ijij
N
i
i PPP
PH
ωωωωω
ω
 
and 
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where ijP  is short for )|( 1 itjt xXxXP == − . For the second 
order Markov process, where the character depends on its 
immediate previous 2 characters, we have 2H  ( )(2 ΩH  is 
omitted): 
)log(
111
2 ijk
M
k
ijk
M
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i
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===
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where ijkP  is short for ),|( 21 itjtkt xXxXxXP === −− . 
Let’s take the second order Markov process for example. 
If we restrict our discussion within the words of 3 characters, 
the entropy of “the” is for sure lower than a randomly 
chosen words, say “thv”, “txy”, or “jzv”. The calculation of 
the entropy is based on our understanding of the probability 
distributions of the letters under the context of legitimate 
English words. We can almost certain that the 3rd character is 
“e” after seeing “t” and “h”. 
The entropy of a password heavily depends on if it is on 
the list of patters or not. If it is, the entropy will be low; 
otherwise, high. Therefore, the problem now is reduced to: if 
a spelling (pattern) is on the list. The next logic question is 
thus what a pattern is. For example, “zoe” is a popular name. 
It is on the list of any password cracking dictionary, but it is 
not on the Fedora Core 5 Linux dictionary. By common 
sense, we would all agree to include “zoe” in the dictionary, 
and thus the entropy for “zoe” will be low, and therefore it is 
not a good password. However, if we go a step further, do 
we accept “abc”, “xyz”, “qwe”, “qru”, “qaz”, and “esz” 
etc. as legitimate patterns? On the keyboard, you can easily 
realize the position patterns of the later 4 spellings. More 
complicated patterns can also be made in this manner. We 
may be reluctant to accept that these spelling are legitimate 
patterns, perhaps just because they are not popular or 
oblivious. However, when talking about passwords, we 
cannot expect popular or oblivious patterns. To keep all 
kinds of unthinkable patterns in the dictionary not only 
enlarges the dictionary but also impossible. Therefore, from 
password guessing point of view, exhaustive search is not 
avoidable. Performing exhaustive search is the same as 
assuming that every character has the exactly same 
probability and leads to higher entropy. 
V. ENTROPY OF GUESSING A PASSWORD 
Guessing a password is different from guessing an English 
word. It is not a Markov process, where we are able to more 
accurately guess the next character based on the knowledge 
of previous characters. To guess a password, we have to 
guess the spelling completely right. There is no partially 
correct guess  some characters are right, and the others are 
wrong. Guessing entropy was proposed by Massey [9] to 
estimate the average number of successive guesses of a set of 
passwords. The lower boundary is: 
12)( 4
1 +×≥ HGE  
Guessing entropy is about the low boundary for the 
number of successive guesses. To the contrary of some 
claims, it is inappropriate to be used as the measurement of 
the quality of individual password. 
Due to the all or nothing nature of guessing a password, it 
is meaningless to calculate the entropy of a password based 
on its composing characters. Without the knowledge of the 
characteristics of the password, the only assumption we can 
make, apart from trying our luck with a big dictionary, is that 
every character has the same probability. This assumption 
leads to maximum entropy. The passwords of the same 
length have the same amount of entropy. As the length 
becomes longer, the entropy of the password goes up, and 
the average entropy per character stays the same. 
In summary, entropy is not a suitable measurement for the 
quality of individual passwords. 
VI. PASSWORD QUALITY INDICATOR 
There are many different types of password attacks [3,4]. 
In essence, password attacking is about trying different 
character combinations until getting a match to the right 
password. To effectively crack a password, some strategies 
have to be in place. The obvious combinations should be 
tried before the brute force enumeration of all possible 
password candidates. In general, a likely path to crack a 
password is, in the order of: 
 
1. trying dictionary words, 
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2. trying 1 (and perhaps 2) character variations to the 
dictionary words, 
3. trying to enumerate all possible spellings of a smaller 
character set, say just lower case characters or all 
lower case characters plus digit characters, and 
finally, 
4. brute force enumeration of all possible password 
candidates with the full character set (93 characters). 
 
The quality of a password depends on how long it takes to 
find out the right match. The longer it takes, the better the 
quality is. Thus, we can measure the quality of a password by 
how different it is from the dictionary words, how long it is, 
and how big the password character set is. 
Levenshtein's editing distance [6] can accurately measure 
how different two strings are. This metric calculates the 
distance between two strings by counting the minimal 
number of single character manipulations required, such as 
an insertion, deletion, or modification, to make the 2 strings 
the same [13]. For example, the distance between “zoe” and 
“coe” is 1, and “the” and “zoe” 2. To measure how 
different a password is from all the base dictionary words, 
first, we line up all the dictionary words, and then, we check 
the Levenshtein's editing distance of the password against 
every single word on the line. The minimum distance is the 
distance of the password to the base dictionary words. 
The length of a password is the number of characters in 
the password. It plays a vital role in deciding how long it 
takes to crack the password. 
A password is made of characters, which are from certain 
groups, e.g., all characters, low case alphabet characters, or 
digit characters. We call these groups character sets. We 
artificially group the 93 printable characters into 4 sets: 
• Character Set 1: 26 lower case letters:  
abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz 
• Character Set 2: 26 upper case letters:  
ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ 
• Character Set 3: 10 digit characters: 01234567890 
• Character Set 4: 31 special characters: 	

 ! 
 
To measure the character sets used in a password, we 
propose password complexity index (PCI). We assign PCI 
value 26 to Character Set 1, 26 to Character Set 2, 10 to 
Character Set 3, and 31 to Character Set 4. If a password 
contains a character from Character Set 1, the value 26 is 
added to the PCI of the password, so long and so forth. 
However, the value of each Character Set is only used once, 
i.e., the second and the subsequent character in the same 
Character Set do not add any extra value to the password 
PCI. If the characters of a password only draw from 
Character Set 3, i.e., only 10 digit characters (0-9), the 
password has the Standard Password Format. A password in 
the standard password format has PCI 10. For example, 
passwords “125467” and “98456902” are in the standard 
password format, but “s125467”, “8765t”, and “ast+Ugh” 
are not. 
For a password Ω , which has PCI value c and length m, 
the number of all possible password candidates of the same 
format is mc . To have the same number of password 
candidates in standard password format, which has PCI value 
of 10, we need to find out the length (L) of the password 
candidates in standard password format. Thus, we have 
Lmc 10= . Therefore, cmL 10log×= . We call L the effective 
length of password P. For example, the effective password 
lengths of passwords “akjuwfg” and “D$f9” are 7.98 and 
7.88 respectively. 
The password quality indicator (PQI) of a password is a 
pair ),( LD=λ , where D is the Levenshtein's editing distance 
of the password to the base dictionary words, and L is the 
effective password length. When D>=3 and L>=14, we 
have a good password. D>=3 means that the password is at 
least 3 characters different from the base dictionary words, 
and L>=14 means that there are at least 1410  possible 
password candidates to be tried to crack the password. 
The easiest way to achieve D>=3 is to have 3 special 
characters (from Character Set 4) in the password. The 
requirement is easy to remember and also easy to implement 
with programs to check if a password meets the requirement. 
Of cause, by using 3 special characters to make D>=3, we 
do miss a number of password candidates which are 3 
Levenshtein's editing distance units away from the base 
dictionary words. However, this simplified solution is 
justified for several reasons. First, 3 special characters 
guarantee the password has at least 3 units of Levenshtein's 
editing distance to the base dictionary words. Second, it is 
easy to remember for the end users. Third, it is also easy to 
implement by computer programs to perform proactive 
password checking. Finally, by forcing 3 special characters 
in the password guarantees an increase in the PCI value, and 
therefore, the effective length of the password. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we first studied password entropy and 
realized that it cannot be used as an indicator for password 
quality. Based on the assumption that the quality of a 
password is in proportion to the time required to crack it, we 
introduced password quality indicator (PQI). From PQI, we 
further develop a simple rule for choosing and checking a 
good quality password  at least 8 characters long, with at 
least 3 special characters plus other alphanumeric 
characters. 
REFERENCES 
[1] BLUNDO, C., D'ARCO, P., SANTIS, A. D. & GALDI, C. (2002) A 
novel approach to proactive password checking. IN DAVIDA, G. I., 
FRANKEL, Y. & REES, O. (Eds.) International Conference on 
Infrastructure Security (InfraSec 2002). Bristol, UK, Springer. 
[2] BURR, W. E., DODSON, D. F. & POLK, W. T. (2006) Electronic 
Authentication Guideline: Recommendations of the National Institute 
586
  
 
of Standards and Technology. 1.0.2 ed., National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, USA. 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-63/SP800-
63V1_0_2.pdf. 
[3] CAMPBELL, J., KLEEMAN, D. & MA, W. (2006) Password 
Composition Policy: Does Enforcement Lead to Better Password 
Choices? 17th Australasian Conference on Information Systems 
(ACIS 2006). Adelaide, Australia. 
[4] CAMPBELL, J., KLEEMAN, D. & MA, W. (2007) The Good and 
Not So Good of Enforcing Password Composition Rules. Information 
Systems Security, 16, 2-8. 
[5] CISNEROS, R., BLISS, D. & GARCIA, M. (2006) Password auditing 
applications. Journal of Computing in Colleges, 21, 196-202. 
[6] LEVENSHTEIN, V. (1965) Binary codes capable of correcting 
deletions, insertions, and reversals. Problems in Information 
Transmission, 1, 8-17. 
[7] MA, W., CAMPBELL, J., TRAN, D. & KLEEMAN, D. (2007) A 
Conceptual Framework for Assessing Password Quality. International 
Journal of Computer Science and Network Security, 7, 179-185. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[8] MACKAY, D. L. C. (2005) Information Theory, Inference, and 
Learning Algorithms, Cambridge University Press (also accessible 
from http://www.inference.phy.cam.ac.uk/mackay/itila/). 
[9] MASSEY, J. L. (1994) Guessing and Entropy. IEEE International 
Symposium on Information Theory. 
[10] PFLEEGER, C. P. & PFLEEGER, S. L. (2003) Security in 
Computing, Prentice Hall. 
[11] SAITA, A. (2005) RSA 2005: Passwords at the breaking point. 
[12] SHANNON, C. E. (1948) A Mathematical Theory of Communication. 
Bell System Technical Journal, 27, 379-423, 623-656. 
[13] STEPHEN, G. (1994) String Searching Algorithms, World Scientific 
Publishing. 
[14] TRAN, D., WAGNER, M., LAU, Y. W. & GEN, M. (2004) Fuzzy 
Methods for Voice-Based Person Authentication. IEEJ (Institute of 
Electrical Engineers of Japan) Transactions on Electronics, 
Information and Systems, 124, 1958-1963. 
[15] YAN, J. (2001) A Note on Proactive Password Checking. ACM New 
Security Paradigms Workshop. New Mexico, USA. 
 
5887
